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Recent Supreme Court activity regarding "intellectual property"
may lead some to believe the increase in cases has some further meaning
beyond the decisions themselves.' In fact, depending on how many year
* Professor of Law, State University ofNew York at Buffalo, School of Law.
1. Fourth Annual Akron IP Professors Forum, IP and the Supreme Court (Nov. 5, 2010).
Papers presented at the forum included the following: Jay Dratler, Jr., The Supreme Court and the
FederalCircuit:A Case of Supervision by Generalists;Susanna Frederick Fischer, Threateningthe
Founding Ideal of a Republic of Letters: An Assessment of the Supreme Court's Copyright
Decisions Over the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century; Thomas C. Folsom, IP in 4D: Four
Degreesof Uncertaintyin IntellectualProperty;Liam O'Melinn, The Supreme Courton Intellectual
Property: JudicialRestraint or Irresponsible Avoidance?; Robert I. Reis, Checks, Balance and
Judicial Wizardry: ConstitutionalDelegationand CongressionalLegislation; Ryan Vacca, IP and
the Supreme Court: A HistoricalPerspective; Elizabeth I. Winston, The TechnologicalEdge.
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one includes in this calculation, there were several significant cases in
the immediate years before the turn of the century that might also qualify
for inclusion. In the immediate past, there were six (6) patent cases:
Bilski,2 Festo,3 MedImmune, 4 eBay,5 KSR,6 and Quanta Electronics.7 In
addition, there were four (4) copyright cases: Tasini,s Eldred,
Grokster,'o and Muchnick." Also, some might think it notable that the
Court has decided four (4) trademark cases: TrafFix,12 Wal-Mart, 3
Victoria's Secret,14 and Dastar." The interests they represent and the
source of power to enact legislation in the field raise distinct issues that
may inform of current judicial interest and concern. These don't
necessarily delineate the constitutional role of the Court relative to the
delegation under Article I, Section Eight, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution.' 6 A gathering of cases using conventional search resources
and techniques17 yielded 666 patent cases' 8 and 73 copyright cases.19
2. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (patentable subject matter) (cited in 19
subsequent cases).
3. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (doctrine of
equivalents) (cited in 30 subsequent cases).
4. MedlImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (declaratory judgments) (cited
in 16 subsequent cases).
5. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (injunctive remedies) (cited 617
times).
6. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness) (cited 509 times). The
downstream effects can be found in the recent Federal Circuit decision regarding obviousness. In re
Glatt Air Techniques, Inc., 630 F.3d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (first-sale doctrine) (cited
in 50 decisions).
8. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (articles in databases) (cited in 55
decisions).
9. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (copyright term extension) (92 subsequent citing
decisions).
10. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (inducing
infringement) (cited in 251 decisions).
11. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2009) (copyright registration) (77
decisions cited case).
12. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (trade dress and patents)
(cited in 287 decisions).
13. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (distinctiveness of trade
dress) (cited in 433 decisions).
14. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (dilution) (cited in 174
decisions).
15. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (trademark
protection creative content) (cited in 283 decisions).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. Such as the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases.
18. This statistic should be qualified as "more or less" because a few of the cases cited for
patents were copyright cases using patent principles as well the 74 copyright cases, starting with
Keplingerv. De Young, 23 U.S. 358 (1825), an action for patent infringement.
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This essay is not intended as a case-by-case analysis, or an exhaustive
source of reference; it is but a sample of these cases. It is a work in
progress attempting to simply share thoughts and perspectives raised by
the litany of cases heard by the Supreme Court over these two
centuries.20
Some of these cases were much anticipated. Most are certainly
notable. But what does that mean in the context of the span of two
centuries of constitutional intellectual property, or for that matter, those
regulatory rights included as intellectual property? Are either the
number of cases or fundamentals of decision-making distinguishable
from prior activity of the Supreme Court? Do these cases reflect
changing perspectives in the exercise of separate but equal and checks
and balances? Is the role of the court and use of precedent different
when acknowledging deference to either the statutory language of
Congress or exercising their constitutional powers of interpretation and
application to specific cases and controversies? What are the catalysts
of congressional action and subsequent review by the court? Why ask
these questions in the first place? It might normally have been expected
in the mix of cases that one would find the court exercised its duty and
powers as a check on the acts of Congress. How many cases have
invalidated either copyright or patent legislation based on a judicial
determination that congressional action exceeded the powers delegated
to Congress under the "intellectual property clause" of the
Constitution21-the "check" in checks and balances? In light of what
19. Starting with Wheaton v. Peters,33 U.S. 591 (1834) (cited in 211 decisions).
20. The specter of the most recent case before the Court will have to wait another day for
substantive consideration. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 U.S. 565 (2010). The
judgment was affirmed by an equally divided court. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case. The case involved the first sale doctrine and gray markets.
21. Other than on free speech. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright
ProtectionsandFreedomof Speech: Why the Copyright ExtensionAct is Unconstitutional,36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002). For due process issues, see generally SIVA VAIDHIYANATHAN,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS

CREATIVITY (2001); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional
Foundationsof the PublicDomain, 66-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003). See also In re
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340
(1998); and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
There are several hundred cases that look at the purpose, expanse and sacrosanctity of the interests
created by Article I, Section 8 to the Congress, including the ability of the states to tax interests thus
created and delegations by the legislature to the court and vice versa. The question generally other
than due process and speech has been whether the purpose of the Article is compromised or balance
disturbed. There were just 20 powers requested of the states to be delegated to the federal
government. Three of these were the power to create patents, copyrights and establish a national
university. These are delegated and limited powers that define delegation to Congress. There is
nothing in the language of the Constitution that leads one to believe the passage of time and
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one might find the answer to that question to be, how does the currently
perceived spate of cases and activity of the Supreme Court inform of the
role played by the Court since they first articulated the nature and extent
of the deference of the Court to Congress pursuant to the provision of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 as set forth in Wheaton v. Peters?22 In the
rather lengthy and well-known quote that follows, consider anew how
this informs beyond the issues of the case about the role of the court in
the centuries to follow:
[The source of delegation and the exercise thereof]
Inthe eighth section of the first article of the constitution ofthe United
States it is declared, that congress shall have power 'to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to
authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries.' And in pursuance of the power thus delegated,
congress passed the act of the 30th of May 1790.
[Judicial construction the meaning of words: constitutional provision
and legislation.]
This is entitled 'an act for the encouragement of learning, by securing
the copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of
such copies, during the times therein mentioned.'

In behalf of the common law right, an argument has been drawn from
the word secure, which is used in relation to this right, both in the
constitution and in the acts of congress. This word, when used as a
verb active, signifies to protect, insure, save, ascertain, &c.

There is no mode by which the meaning affixed to any word or
sentence, by a deliberative body, can be so well ascertained, as by
comparing it with the words and sentences with which it stands

circumstance was intended to alter the delegation to the federal government, nor the purpose or
balance between purpose and rights created to accomplish those ends. See generally Dotan Oliar,
The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. REv. 421 (2009); Malla
Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress"in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the ProgressClause, 80 NEB. L. REV.
754 (2001); see also Vivian J. Fong, Are We Making Progress?:The Constitutionas a Touchstone
for CreatingConsistent PatentLaw andPolicy, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1163 (2009); Robert I. Reis,
Progress,Innovation and Technology: A Delicate "Google" Balance,BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011).
22. Wheaton, 33 U.S. 591.
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connected. By this rule the word secure, as used in the constitution,
could not mean the protection of an acknowledged legal right. It refers
to inventors, as well as authors, and it has never been pretended, by
any one, either in this country or in England, that an inventor has a
perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented.
And if the word secure is used in the constitution, in reference to a
future right, was it not so used in the act of congress?
That congress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference
to existing rights, appears clear, from the provision that the author, &c.
'shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,'&c. Now if this
exclusive right existed at common law, and congress was about to
adopt legislative provisions for its protection, would they have used
this language? Could they have deemed it necessary to vest a right
already vested? Such a presumption is refuted by the words above
quoted, and their force is not lessened by any other part of the act.
Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as
contended for, created it. This seems to be the clear import of the law,
connected with the circumstances under which it was enacted.23
Do Keplinger2 4 or Wheaton25 and the over seven hundred cases
heard by the Supreme Court since provide perspective on the more
limited but pragmatically significant role of statutory interpretation
assumed by the court? Do these cases illuminate the efficacy of the
inherent judicial function in balancing constitutional objectives with
congressional purpose respecting private rights and public benefit? Is
this "balance" the requisite and proper constitutional role of the court in
copyright and patent cases? 2 6
This exercise rests on an extraordinary body of prior scholarship.
These publications serve as both teaching and validation of a quest for
meaningful perspectives regarding past decisions and future
paradigms.27 Many scholars have engaged in the gathering of cases on
which to base their larger empirical observation.28 One wonders,
23. Id.at 660-61.
24. KeplingeT v. De Young, 23 U.S. 358 (1825).
25. Wheaton, 33 U.S. 591.
26. See Robert I. Reis, The Sony Legacy: Secondary Liability Perspectives, 3 AKRON INTELL.
PROP. J. 205 (2010) and see, e.g., Robert I. Reis, Rights andRemedies PosteBay v. MercExchange
-Deep Waters Stirred,2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (2008); Reis, supra note 21.
27. Id.
28. Pamela Samuelson, The ConstitutionalLaw of Intellectual Property After Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 50 J. Copyright Soc'y (2003). See also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2006);
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however, whether there is a distinctly cognitive visceral perspective to
be gained from the gathering and reading as many of the seven hundred
cases as possible. Is there a sense of continuity and broader context and
appreciation of the attention given intellectual property issues in the
immediate past decade? What are the constants in the rules behind these
cases? It isn't simply the traditional legal citation and dependence on
precedent, but the underlying reason and role of the court that makes
precedent serve the purpose of a constitutional directive in endlessly
changing circumstances. Certainly, almost two hundred years of
stability and apparent balance have been maintained by repeated
recitation of the promise of reward for public benefits in the shadows of
the perceived pillars of purpose and limitation standing tall in the
constitutional provisions of "progress" and "limited times" as
fundamentals. Whether these words are actual limitations on the
delegated power of Congress, or are "prefatory", they worked as de facto
underpinnings in the role played by the court by separation of powers.
This may be the unintended sequence or proposition that comes into
focus when reviewing and comparing the line of cases from the
inception. As already noted, this may not qualify as the check
anticipated, but rather a sense of wonderment in the pragmatic exercise
of inherent judicial powers in "balance."
What is balance but creatively accepting the delegation of powers
under the Constitution to Congress, yet, ensuring constitutional and
statutory purpose by exercise of inherent judicial functions of the court?
The succession of cases inform of those issues and changes in
circumstance of concern, of rights created, of remedies appropriate,
goals articulated and consequences understood. These include issues
specific not only of congressional concern, but, as well, the rights of the
parties and the public interest (benefit or detriment) inherent in the
judicial process and province of "balance" which is often the articulated
concern of the court in "checks and balances." These constants include
clich6s, metaphors,2 9 "marks", "bright lines" and any number of other
images of shared understanding. They include: "reward", "detriment to
the public" (eBay),30 "limited times", "progress", "reversion to the
Jessica

Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REv. 19 (1996); The
Public Domain, 66-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003); Symposium, FairUse: "Incredibly
Shrinking" or ExtraordinaryExpanding?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 603 (2008).
29. Maybe this is simply an expanded allusion to Justice Story on metaphysics and metaphors.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C. Mass. 1841).
30. This is the critical element reflecting the public interest eBay reminded be considered in
the discretionary use of injunctive remedies. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006).
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public domain", "spread of knowledge", etc. If the focus of these
questions is limited to the specific issues and parties in any given case,
then the role played by the court in balance may be dimmed.
11. CATALYSTS AND CHALLENGES OF CHANGE: AN ENDLESS EMULSION
OF SUBJECT MATTER, TECHNOLOGY, NORMATIVE FORCES, ECONOMIC
VALUES, DISTRIBUTIVE ENABLEMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND MORE."

It is no surprise that the specific subject matter in issue before the
Court has changed over time. Nor is it a revelation that almost every
case had one or more cases on similar issues decided with like results
from the earliest of times. The rules have remained relatively constant,
but the facts, balance and implications change in each new context. The
value of over seven hundred cases is a context in which there are
moments of striking familiarity and a growing awareness that there is a
pattern, not disconnect, and function serving constitutional purpose
beyond the clich6 of checks and balances. Following are a few instances
of ddji vu applications from old to new that highlight a few of the
thoughts gathered from a reading of the flow of cases.

31. It is this boundless set of issues that makes the focus of rights and governance critical to
intellectual futures and basic human rights. The following studies represent a search, without
answers, for a sustainable perspective on intellectual rights and wrongs. One learns from successes
in baby steps and failures as well. These citations map the ontogeny of portions of travels to this
point: Robert I. Reis, The Relationship of Technology Enablement to Regulatory Structures (Mar.
24, 2011) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society, J.W. Marriott Resort,
Las Vegas, NV) (on file with author); Robert I. Reis, The Public Beneficial Interest in the
Intellectual Commons: The Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine and Necessary Standing to
Represent the Public Interest (paper presented at the 6th Annual IPSC Conference, Aug. 10-11,
2006), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edulinstitutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/Reis.pdf; Robert I.
Reis, Explorationfor Intellectual Capital-Legal,Technicaland Social Issues Autism-A Mystery
ofEpidemic Proportions(paper presented at the 9th Annual IPSC Conference, Depaul University,
Aug. 6-7, 2009) (The hypothesis being that anything labeled epidemic by the CDC should have
research and scholarship readily available for review. That was not the conclusion of the study.),
available at http://www.law.depau.edulcenters_institutes/ciptit/ipsc/paper/RobertReisPaper.pdf.
A delightful presentation distinguishing "access" and IP rights can be found in a more recent article:
Randal C. Picker, FairUse v. FairAccess, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 603 (2008); Reis, Rights and
Remedies Post Ebay v. Mercexchange-Deep Waters Stirred,supra note 26 (raising the issue of
separation of powers and discretionary remedies); Reis, The Sony Legacy: Secondary Liability
Perspectives,supra note 26 (note discussion of inference in secondary liability cases as well as
technology transfer assessment protocols that permit assessment of potentials represented by
innovation); Reis, supranote 21.
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Bilski

The decision of the Court in Bilski 32 was anxiously awaited. The
question addressed was whether using a mathematical formula to permit
investors, suppliers and end users to hedge the risks of fluctuation in
market price changes and demand was a patentable process within the
meaning of section 101.33 This, in turn, depended on the statutory
definition of "process", and whether a "process" required enablement be
coupled with a machine or device under the machine-or-transformation
test to limit the patent right and enable the use of the basic algorithm by
others for alternative uses. 34 The Court rejected any "categorical"
analysis, one way or the other.3 5 The Bilski Court indicated that the
broad language of the Act would permit a "process" in and of itself to be
eligible for patent protection under the proper circumstance, although
they did not venture further by delineation of what that might be. The
Court attempted to clarify that the machine-or-transformation test is not
the only test for patent protection under section 101.37 They admonished
that neither does it mean that the process at issue is or is not a
recognized process for patent protection.38 In the final analysis, the
claims in the case of Bilski were found to include "the basic concept of
hedging which reduced that concept to a mathematical formula"
rendering the process ineligible for patent qualification as an abstract
mathematical formulation or algorithm.

32. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). It is a little more than interesting that BNA
Daily Tax Report reports, "Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) and
Finance member Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) Jan. 20 unveiled legislation they plan to introduce that
would stop the patenting of tax strategies...". Alison Bennet, Grassley, Baucus Unveil Legislation
to Stop PatentingofTax Strategies,BNA Daily Tax Report, Jan. 21, 2011, 11.
33. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
34. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3220.
35. Id. at 3236. See, e.g., Robert I. Reis, Rights andRemedies Post Ebay v. MercExchangeDeep Waters Stirred,supranote 26 (considering discretion, an inherent judicial function).
36. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221.
37. Id at 3218.
38. Id.
39. One of the many Amicus briefs submitted evidenced a concern that a narrowing of the
patent right would have a negative economic impact on a community dependent of the revenues of
like intellectual properties and applications. Brief of the Intellectual Property Section of the Nevada
State Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
(No. 08-964), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1008. Consider further that abstractions and
algorithms belong to all unless reduced to practice as process tied to a "machine" that limits the
nature of the private right. Unless so tied, the "invention" may not be eligible for patent protection.
The broad public benefit lies not only in the invention, but in not privatizing more than specific to
the patent to ensure the use of these incidents for all to use in invention. The question was phrased
as that of congressional intent in the drafting of the statute, but not as that of constitutional
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The tenets of deference to statutory language and interpretation in
this context mirror that of Wheaton.40 In Bilski, the issue faced by the
Court was how to implement the intent of Congress to broaden the
meaning of "process" while, at the same time, remain fast on limiting
patenting algorithms and other abstract or fundamental constructs to the
detriment of future users.41 Surprisingly, the Court notes there are
judicial exceptions in the interpretive process based on precedent that
42
The three
constitute "perceived" exceptions to section 101's reach.
abstract
and
exceptions are "laws of nature, physical phenomena
43
ideas." Does this qualify as "wizardry" in the balance aspect of checks
and balances? Note the attempt of the Court to justify what rarely is
acknowledged by the following statement:
And, in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute
as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years[;]" ...
concepts converged by these exceptions are "part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men... free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.""
The Court also noted:
It is important to emphasize that the Court today is not commenting on
the patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any
of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should
or should not receive patent protection. This Age puts the possibility of
innovation in the hands of more people and raises new difficulties for
the patent law. With ever more people trying to innovate and thus
seeking patent protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a
great challenge in striking the balance between protecting inventors
and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would
discover by independent, creative application of general principles.
Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position on where that
balance ought to be struck.45

limitation. The economic preservation issue must be viewed as a balance with progress and future
use of the common elements of nascent patents. These matters underlie many of these cases and
reviews. The economic aspect may be the reward, but not the objective of intellectual property.
Despite this observation, vested interests prevail in the shadows of many cases and contexts. See
generallyEldred v. Ashcroit, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
40. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). See also O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62
(1853).
41. See generallyBilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218.
42. Id.at 3228; 35 U.S.C. § 101.
43. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
44. Id. at 3225.
45. Id at 3228.
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What would be the benefit and the detriment were this not the
practice and the rule? If one really needs justification for this "outrage"
ofjudicial balance, the ultimate justification may lie in the implicit belief
that if Congress objected to this interpretation for the past 150 years it
would have amended the statute.46
There are several notable cases that qualify as d6ji vu and rationale
for this holding such as O'Reilly v. Morse.4 7 The Roy v. Tatham4 case
has been cited 372 times in total, including 73 times in courts and
administrative proceedings and 17 times and two cases before the Courts
as party thereto. Both O'Reilly4 9 and Roys 0 raise questions concerning
the force of legislation, the intent of Congress, the substance of
invention, the impact of privatizing abstract principles and the coupling
of the abstract principals with the tangible invention. Morse is
particularly instructive because of the clearly articulated reduction of
claimed subject matter to protect the recognized public interest and
avoid the issues raised in Bilski." Morse involved the use of electro
magnetism as an abstract principle and force of nature as a means of
transmitting and printing messages over great distances powered by
electric impulses sent and received by machines at either end.5 2 Morse
conceived of his invention on a return voyage from France to New York
in 1832.' The period of invention, testing, modification of invention,
filing of caveats, surrender of invention and modification of claims and
reissuance of final patent with limited claims took almost two decades.54

46. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
47. See generally O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
48. See generally Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853), which demonstrated the use of lead
for pipes not claimed, but the application was: The essential difference in the character of this pipe,
which distinguishes it, as well as that contemplated by Thomas Burr, from all other heretofore
known or attempted, is that it is wrought under heat, by pressure and constriction, from set metal;
and that it is not a casting formed in a mould. And they declare, 'We do not claim as our invention
and improvement, any of the parts of the above-described machinery, independently of its
arrangement and combination above set forth. What we do claim as our invention, and desire to
secure, is, the combination of the following parts above described, to wit: the core and bridge, or
guide-piece, with the cylinder, the piston, the chamber and the die, when used to form pipes of
metal, under heat and pressure, in the manner set forth, or in any other manner substantially the
same.' Id. at 160.
49. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 62.
50. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 156.
51. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218.
52. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 70-73.
53. Id at 62.
54. Id at 70-73.
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The final reissue patent was granted in 1848, fully 16 years after the first
conception of the invention."
Morse's final description of the invention claimed speaks for itself:
First. Having thus fully described my invention, I wish it to be
understood that I do not claim the use of the galvanic current, or
current of electricity, for the purpose of telegraphic communications,
generally; but what I specially claim as my invention and
improvement, is making use of the motive power of magnetism, when
developed by the action of such current or currents, substantially as set
forth in the foregoing description of the first principal part of my
invention, as means of operating or giving motion to machinery, which
may be used to imprint signals upon paper or other suitable material, or
to produce sounds in any desired manner, for the purpose of
telegraphic communication at any distances.s5
As does this further excerpt from the Court:
Now whether the Telegraph is regarded as an art or machine, the
manner and process of making or using it must be set forth in exact
terms. The act of Congress makes no difference in this respect between
an art and a machine. An improvement in the art ... must be so
described; and so must the art of printing by the motive power of steam
[sic]. And in all of these cases it has always been held, that the patent
embraces nothing more than the improvement described and claimed
as new, and that anyone who afterwards discovered a method of
accomplishing the same object, substantially and essentially differing
from the one described, had a right to use it. Can there be any good
reason why the art of printing at a distance, by means of the motive
power of the electric or galvanic current, should stand on different
principles? Is there any reason why the inventor's patent should cover
broader ground? It would be difficult to discover anything in the act of
Congress which would justify this distinction. The specification of this
patentee describes his invention or discovery, and the manner and
process of constructing and using it; and his patent, like inventions in
7
the other arts above mentioned, covers nothing more.
The provisions of the acts of Congress in relation to patents may be
summed up in a few words:
Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced, in any
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of

55. Id.at 84-85.
56. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 118-19.
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certain means, is entitled to a patent for it; provided he specifies the
means he uses in a manner so full and exact, that any one skilled in the
science to which it appertains, can, by using the means he specifies,
without any addition to, or subtraction from them, produce precisely
the result he describes. And if this cannot be done by the means he
describes, the patent is void. And if it can be done, then the patent
confers on him the exclusive right to use the means he specifies to
produce the result or effect he describes, and nothing more. And it
makes no difference, in this respect, whether the effect is produced by
chemical agency or combination; or by the application of discoveries
or principles in natural philosophy known or unknown before his
invention; or by machinery acting altogether upon mechanical
principles. In either case he must describe the manner and process as
above mentioned, and the end it accomplishes. And any one may
lawfully accomplish the same end without infringing the patent, if he
uses means substantially different from those described.
The following excerpt from Le Roy v. Tatham59 provides another
perspective of Bilsko foundations:
It is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be
discovered in addition to those already known. Through the agency of
machinery a new steam power may be said to have been generated. But
no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself, under the
patent laws. The same may be said of electricity, and of any other
power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may be applied to
useful purposes by the use of machinery.
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and
concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention. The elements of
the power exist; the invention is not in discovering them, but in
applying them to useful objects. Whether the machinery used be novel,
or consist of a new combination of parts known, the right of the
inventor is secured against all who use the same mechanical power or
one that shall be substantially the same.
A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as
that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by
any means whatsoever. This, by creating monopolies, would

58. Id.
59. See generallyLe Roy, 55 U.S. 156 (cited in 77 subsequent cases).
60. See generallyBilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218.
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discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of the
patent laws. 6'
Le Roy v. Tatham62 is but one more example of not simply blind
citation, but the repetition and application of the fundamental principles
of constitutional law and the role of the court in maintaining relevance
and balance through "judicious" application of the principles to each
case as they may change over time. The fact that Congress enacts and
that the court implements and applies is nothing but the "wizardry" of
balance.
B.

KSR International

The search for a pattern continues with a look at KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.63 KSR focused on whether the proposed invention
was rendered ineligible for patent protection because it was obvious to
those skilled in the arts." The subject matter under consideration
involved the development of an adjustable pedal assembly using a sensor
to send digital data to an onboard processer used to record pedal position
for the purpose of fuel flow or breaking.65 The question was whether
this was new or novel.66 Prior methods of control involved fixed pedals,
rods, or pulleys and even moveable, adapted pulleys.6 ' The question is
whether the prior art was such that any person skilled in the art would
consider sensors an obvious alternative to mechanical or other functional
devices.
If known or obvious, it is not new or novel and not
"invention" for the purposes of patent qualification under section 103 .
The determination of what is new or novel or obvious is properly the
subject of judicial interpretation. It is part and parcel of the judicial
function of applying the language of the statute to achieve balance in the
fundamental constitutional purpose of protecting private rights and
public purpose. The Court cites and quotes from Graham v. John Deere

61. LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 174-75.
62. LeRoy, 55 U.S. 156.
63. See generally KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (incredibly already
cited in 509 decisions).
64. Id. at 398-99.
65. Id.
66. Id.at 400.
67. Id. at 409.
68. Id. at 400.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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Co. of Kansas City70 to demonstrate the appropriate standard for
"obvious":
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness
of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented."
The district court made the determination that use of sensors as a
substitute for other control mechanisms would be anticipated as obvious
by one of ordinary skill in the relevant art.72 This does not mean one
who would be looking for a specific solution, but a standard that would
cover anyone who understood the wide range of applications that such
control devices could be put to. The meaning of "obvious" is expansive
and somewhat variable depending on context as well as the nature of the
art under consideration. The notation of the Court in KSR, while
informative, leaves much to the translation. The KSR Court teaches:
The principles underlying these cases are instructive when the question
is whether a patent claiming the combination of elements of prior art is
obvious. When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in
the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can
implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.
For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it
would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is
obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill... a court
must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of
prior art elements according to their established functions.
Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it
is here because the claimed subject matter may involve more than the
simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere
application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the
improvement. Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to
70. See generallyGraham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (cited in 3244
decisions).
71. Id.at 17-18.
72. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 216 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
73. See generallyKSR, 550 U.S. at 398.
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interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands
known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in
the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason
to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at
issue. To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit...
("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness"). As our precedents make clear, however,
the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific
subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of
the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the
art would employ. 74
Perhaps this is a matter where mythology cited below can shed light
on reality. Long before the "common law", there existed a person
having but ordinary skill in the arts, which, for the purpose of this
parable, may be of use to determine whether the invention was obvious,
even though there was, for long times, an apparent reason to combine the
known elements in the fashion claimed in the use of known elements to
accomplish a task of great utility. Consider the example used by Justice
Brennan for both context and reason in deliberating the use of water
under pressure to clean a dairy farm floor as proper subject matter for a
patent in Sakraidav. Ag Pro,Inc.":
Among the labors of Hercules is the following: "Heracles now set out
to perform his fifth Labour, and this time his task was to cleanse the
stables of Augeas in a single day. Augeas was a rich king of Elis, who
had three thousand cattle. At night the cattle always stood in a great
court surrounded with walls, close to the king's palace, and as it was
quite ten years since the servants had cleaned it out, there was enough
refuse in the court to build up a high mountain. Heracles went to
Augeas and asked if he would give him the tenth part of his flocks ifhe
thoroughly cleansed his stables in a single day. The king looked upon
this as such an absolutely impossible feat that he would not have
minded promising his kingdom as a reward for it, so he laughed and
said, 'Set to work, we shall not quarrel about the wages,' and he
further promised distinctly to give Heracles what he asked, and this he
did in the presence of Phyleus, his eldest son, who happened to be
there. The next morning Heracles set to work, but even his strong arms

74. Id at 417-18.
75. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 275-76 (1976).
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would have failed to accomplish the task ifthey had not been aided by
his mother-wit. He compelled a mighty torrent to work for him, but
you would hardly guess how he did it. First he opened great gates on
two opposite sides of the court, and then he went to the stream, and
when he had blocked up its regular course with great stones, he
conducted it to the court that required to be cleansed, so that the water
streamed in at one end and streamed out at the other, carrying away all
the dirt with it. Before evening the stream had done its work and was
restored to its usual course. 76
Obviousness in this case is "obvious" to "one skilled with the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in
the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to
combine the known elements in the fashion claimed."" Whether
"obvious" is not so obvious in many, if not most other circumstances, is
a fundamental question of statutory interpretation and judicial discretion.
Some believe that KSR is another step in confusing whether "obvious" is
a question of fact for the jury, or a matter of law for the Court.7 1 Is it
equally obvious that the interpretation of the statute must be
accomplished in a manner that serves to protect the inventor, the purpose
of reward, the value of the invention, the public benefit and prevent
detriment by the expansion of the patent right beyond constitutional
direction and statutory language?
III. BLIPS, PARADOXES AND PARAPHRAXIES 79

A. A Blip and Correction
As noted in at the outset of this journey, throughout the long years
and varied cases considered, there has been respect in deference to
Congress, but wisdom and patience in the interpretation of statutory
language. There have been a few "blips" along the way and one paradox
or paraphraxies. One perspective on the recent decision in MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,Ltd ,so is simply that it was the
76. Id at 275-76 (quoting C. WITT, CLASSIC MYTHOLOGY 119-20(1883)).
77. Id.at 278.
78. See generally Chris Cotropia, KSR and the Line Between Fact and Law, PATENTLY-O
BLOG (May 6, 2007, 7:30 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/05/ksrandthe_1in.html.
See also Dennis Crouch, Judge versus Jury: Who Should Decide the Question of Obviousness?,
PATENTLY-O BLOG (Aug. 19, 2009, 8:59 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/08/medela-

ag-v-kinetic-concepts-inc-on-petition-for-a-writ-of-certiorari-2009-after-their-success-in-ksr-jamesdabney-and.html.
79. Paraphraxies used in a non-Freudian context. See infra note 84.
80. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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remediation of the inapposite adoption of the "Staple Article of
Commerce" doctrine borrowed from patent law in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.8 1 The Court assuaged its sense
of deference to statutory language by analogizing copyrights to patent
law mindful that creation of both were in the same delegation to
Congress under the Constitution.8 2 This simplistic use of the practice of
the Court warrants the label "blip" to be put on the case, albeit the
decision itself stands as viable. Groksterpartially righted the use of the
"adopted" doctrine by placing emphasis on actual behavior and business
practice of the parties, rather than inferences drawn from end user
infringements. 83
B.

A Paradox

The singular intellectual property case that stands out as a
paradox/paraphraxiesse in deviation from the obligation of the Court to
consider the constitutionality of legislative enactment in the context of
the language used both in the constitution and legislative enactment is
Eldredv. Ashcroft.8 ' Eldreddoes not, however, stand alone in the flow
of cases through history before the Supreme Court that raise questions
Some light may
regarding the issues of the underlying paraphraxies.
be brought to the case by realizing the conflicts, pressures and
competing interests in Eldred are not singularly different as "intellectual

81. See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
82. See Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 913.
83. See generally Reis, The Sony Legacy: Secondary LiabilityPerspectives,supra note 26.
84. This is used here in the non-Freudian adaptation of slip of the tongue, misstate or hidden
agenda or meaning. What was the real purpose of eliminating "progress" as purpose and limitation
on the delegated powers to Congress? Was it to further the protection of vested IP rights without
limitation based on consideration of the impact of term extension on public beneficial use? Who
represented the public beneficial use in the case and what consideration was given the multiple of
amicus briefs filed that raised acknowledged legitimate issues, but were treated as either anecdotal
or raised by one without standing in the case. See, for example, further action of the matter in
subsequent cases: Note the language of the court in Golan v. Ashcroft: "...I agree with Defendant
that Plaintiffs' CTEA claim is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
supra. In Eldred, the Supreme Court ruled, on the Petitioners' claim that Congress exceeded its
authority under the Copyright and Patent clause, that the CTEA did not violate the constitutional
requirement that copyrights endure for 'limited Times.' Although the Petitioners in Eldreddid "not
challenge the 'life-plus-70-years' timespan itself..." Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218
(D. Colo. 2004) (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003)). See also Golan v. Holder,
611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009).
85. Eldred,537 U.S. at 188.
86. See generally Eldred,537 U.S. 186.
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property" than for other commons resources, public and private interests
and ostensible governmental custodianship. 87
In the context of cases that have come before and the cases that will
be noted hereafter, the question remains: What was the primary purpose
of CTEA? Was it because the Congress and the Court believed that
extending the copyright term would result in encouraging creative
ventures? Was it to honor and pay homage to the efforts of Sonny Bono
to secure the copyright term extension on behalf of the powerful
entertainment industry? Was it the culmination and final victory for
Noah Webster who fought tirelessly to expand the range of his protected
rights in his dictionary?8 8 Was it because empirical evidence was
Was it more
provided that reward produced creative ventures?
simplistically to bring the copyright regimes of this country in line with
that of others to secure protection for copyrights in other nation states for
the benefit of authors? 89 Was it to protect the economic value of all
copyrights of this country because the United States needed those values
as a rapidly evolving debtor nation? Was it one of any number or
combination of factors, including the power of the entertainment
industry's lobbyists and sense of special status that over the centuries
has become the focus of the "intellectual property" clause of the
Constitution, rather than a means, an end in itself? There is no answer
that either satisfies everyone in this inquiry or "fits all." It certainly
fuels the belief that leads some to think the primary objective was the
87. See generally The Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003), an entire issue
devoted to an expansive view of the public domain with some segue to natural resources. See also
Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the
Durationof CopyrightProtection,36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (2002).
88. There was testimony during the hearing on the copyright reform from any number of
interested individuals and groups, including the Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters. The
primary focus of many of these presentations addressed the economic incentives created by the
CTEA. Mary Beth Peters proffered that the term extension for copyright of existing works might
". . . provide additional income that would finance the production and distribution of new works."
House Hearings 158. "Authors would not be able to continue to create," the Register explained,
unless they earned income on their finished works. The public benefits not only from an
author's original work but also from his or her further creations. Although this truism
may be illustrated in many ways, one of the best examples is Noah Webster[,] who
supported his entire family from the earnings on his speller and grammar during the
twenty years he took to complete his dictionary.
Eldred,537 U.S. at 207.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). This standard harmonizes the baseline United States copyright term
with the term adopted by the European Union in 1993. See Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29
October 1993, Harmonizingthe Term ofProtectionof Copyrightand CertainRelatedRights, 1993
OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMS. (L290), p. 9 (EU Council Directive 93/98). For anonymous works,
pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years
from creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c); Eldred,537 U.S. at 195-96.
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reconciliation of private rights with international treaties at the expense
of the public benefit. If so, why was the century long "belief' that
"progress" was a stated goal of the Constitution dismissed as prefatory?
If so, why, in light of the contemporary concerns of the Founders to the
abuses of monopolies from whence they came, did the Court not
continue the metaphor of limited times meaning "short" time before
reversion to the public domain. And, why did the Court ignore the
notation of Wheaton that unless all the requisite acts to justify the
purpose of copyright for public use be fulfilled, there should be no
copyright lest it should remain forever in the public domain?
The litany of the Eldredlegacy actually begins with three discrete
issues, the first being the threshold question of standing to be heard
before the Court. 90 Eldred denied standing to those who did not have a
direct economic interest in the subject matter and demeaned individual
or collective representation of the public interest. 9'
This had been the subject of extended consideration in Sierra Club,
with the heart of the dispute being the philosophical difference between
the majority of the Court and the dissents of Justice Douglas, Justice
Brennan, and Justice Blackmun.92 The position of the majority denying
standing was set forth by Justice Stewart:
... to authorize judicial review at the behest of organizations or
individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value
preferences through the judicial process... would have us ... do just
that.93
Every school boy may be familiar with Alexis de Tocqueville's
famous observation, written in the 1830's, that 'scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later,
into a judicial question.'1 Democracy in America 280 (1945). Less
familiar, however, is De Tocqueville's further observation that judicial
review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the
behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a
particular, concrete injury. 'It will be seen, also, that by leaving it to
private interest to censure the law, any by intimately uniting the trial of
the law with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from
wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit. The

90. Eldred,537 U.S. at 186.
91. See generally Reis, The PublicBeneficial Interestin the IntellectualCommons, supra note
31.
92. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
93. The definition of value preference is demeaning as something "less than" fundamental or
recognized as important or accepted.
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errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a real want; and it is
always a positive and appreciable fact that must serve as the basis of a
prosecution.94
Is this not the demeaning of those who profess to raise issues of
public interest, without alleging private harm, a denial of the right of
every citizen who are the inherent sovereigns in the delegation of powers
to the federal government? Is this not that which the majority condoned
in Eldredto deny the plaintiff standing in the case to raise broader issues
than its narrow economic stake in the outcome or subsequent cases on
remand from having their day in court?95 Is challenging the economic
interest of the public domain publishers as a "windfall" similar in import
as that of labeling their interest a "value preference to denigrate public
interest participation as in Sierra Club"?
And, in the flow of constitutional decision making, was not the next
element, the excessive deference to Congress and reluctance to assume
judicial responsibility for "governance," in this particular case, distinct
from the routine deference in most other cases particularly regarding
intellectual property matters? Alexis de Tocqueville was correct in
calling this a matter of basic governance. It is a question at the heart of
our governance structure of checks and balances for the purpose of
protecting the public beneficial interests. The obligations of "checks"
and "balances" are not prefatory, they are mandatory. Those rights lie at
the heart of the EU human rights requirements, as well as the EU
concern to protect competition in pre-legislation review and judicial
process. 96
The dissents of the Justices in Eldred, despite their harsh treatment
in the majority opinion, confirm the value of the dissent in the judicial
process for they highlight and call attention to that which would
otherwise pass for the norm.97 The litany of dissent concerns can be
read as wide ranging, albeit only a few are highlighted here.
Fundamental issues of disagreement include: separation of powers and
judicial review, abdication of congressional obligation to external
94. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739.
95. See Eldred,537 U.S. 186.
96. See generally, Reis, supra note 21. One may wonder how this issue escalates from a
simple exercise on the implications of cases heard by the Supreme Court during the past decade, but
then isn't that the philosophical divide in how one perceives the meaning and intent of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8?
97. The majority opinion interjects points from the two dissents, which shed light on and
clarify fundamental disagreement beyond the specific issues of the case, but reflect on the role of
the judiciary under separation of powers and the inherent nature and limitations on the delegation of
the copyright and patent delegations to Congress. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741-60.
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standards (the EU), the interpretation of constitutional language
regarding purpose, reward, beneficiaries and benefits, the nature and
intent of term limits on interests created, the purpose and impact of term
limits, the validation of acts of Congress by prior incremental changes
either not challenged or of less than paradoxical proportion. These are
but a few of many issues singled out as evident in the case and
fundamental to an appreciation of the extensive reach of Eldred.9 '
Eldredmaj ority:
In sum, we find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at
liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they
may be. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the CTEA-which
continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and
existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes-is an
impermissible exercise of Congress' power under the Copyright
Clause.99
Justice Stevens, dissenting oo
[I]nsofar as the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 112
Stat. 2827, purported to extend the life of unexpired copyrights, it is
invalid. Because the majority's contrary conclusion rests on the
mistaken premise that this Court has virtually no role in reviewing
congressional grants of monopoly privileges to authors, inventors, and
their successors, Irespectfully dissent. 1o0

By failing to protect the public interest in free access to the products of
inventive and artistic genius-indeed, by virtually ignoring the central
purpose of the Copyright/Patent Clause-the Court has quitclaimed to
Congress its principal responsibility in this area of the law. Fairly read,
the Court has stated that Congress' actions under the Copyright/Patent
Clause are, for all intents and purposes, judicially unreviewable. That
result cannot be squared with the basic tenets of our constitutional
structure. It is not hyperbole to recall the trenchant words of Chief
Justice John Marshall: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1
98. SeeEldred, 537 U.S. at 207.
99. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208. This could have been read by the dissents quite differently. "We
are not at liberty" [to avoid our constitutional obligations under separation of powers to review acts
ofcongress pursuant to constitutional delegation to ensure compliance with the language and intent
thereof.]
100. Eldred,537 U.S. at 222-42.
101. Id at223.
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Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). We should discharge that
responsibility as we did in Chadha.102
Justice Breyer, dissenting 03 :
The Constitution's Copyright Clause grants Congress the power to
"promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to

Authors ...the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." Art. I, § 8,
cl. 8 (emphasis added). The statute before us, the 1998 Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, extends the term of most existing
copyrights to 95 years and that of many new copyrights to 70 years
after the author's death. The economic effect ofthis 20-year extensionthe longest blanket extension since the Nation's founding-is to make
the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual. Its primary legal
effect is to grant the extended term not to authors, but to their heirs,
estates, or corporate successors. And most importantly, its practical
effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of "Science"-by
which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge, E.
Walterscheid, The Nature of the IntellectualPropertyClause:A Study
in HistoricalPerspective 125-126 (2002).

The majority believes these conclusions rest upon practical
judgments that at most suggest the statute is unwise, not that it is
unconstitutional. Legal distinctions, however, are often matters of
degree. ... And in this case the failings of degree are so serious that
they amount to failings of constitutional kind. Although the Copyright
Clause grants broad legislative power to Congress, that grant has
limits. And in my view this statute falls outside them."'
The language of the holding, while innocuous and apologetic on its
face, appears fully appreciated by Justices Stevens and Breyer as
obfuscating the legitimacy of the prior line of term extensions cited to
justify the current extension.' 0 5 The impact of prior incidents of
extension was relatively modest as was the impact on the total duration
of the copyright interest. If there were "alarm" bells for the prior
extensions, they were not noted. In this instance, however, the extension
and the totality of the copyright duration still ring bells of alarm. Life
likewise, the force behind extension, was not external as in this case to
bring us into conformity with other nation states.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 242.
Id at 242-69, app.
Id. at 242-43.
See Eldred,537 U.S. at 222-69.
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Rather than follow established rules of statutory and constitutional
construction regarding the meaning of words and phrases in the context
of where and how they were used, the Court used dictionary definitions,
out of context, to emasculate the only two, if not primary, substantive
6
limitations in the delegation under the Constitution to Congress.o The
collateral damage of this is that "progress" is not considered purpose, but
prefatory, and the duration of copyrights extend to life of the author plus
70 years, before reversion and unfettered use in the public domain for
two, three or even four generations to come. The coincidence of public
benefit and private right may be thought by some diminished to a clich6
and the foundation of the new readings an example of fallacious
syllogism. The reality may be the uninviting perspective of detriment to
the almost uniform consistency of belief in these foundation principles
from Wheaton 07 to date, rendering the objective of public user
illusory. 0 8
What is the outcome of this view of the decision? Is it that there
remains no objective standard to measure legislative enactments under
the Constitution? There has been considerable scholarship both in
anticipation of and after the Eldred case, which sheds light on the
meaning of "progress" as "spread" and education, clearly the purpose of
the amendment in light of the fact that only twenty powers were
requested by the federal government,IS three of which were the
copyright power, the patent power and the power to create a national
university-all about education and "spread" of knowledge.
In light of the years of metaphors touting a benefit to the public
lying in the unfettered right of use on reversion to the public domain, the
term of life of the author plus 70 years may be construed as both
"rivalrous" and consumptive, posing an impediment to innovation,
progress and public beneficial use."l0 Or, perhaps it is all as succinctly
noted by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh"':
This is one of those intricate and embarrassing questions, arising in the
administration of civil justice, in which it is not, from the peculiar
nature and character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any
satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles
applicable to all cases. Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 248.
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
Reis, supranote 21.
Oliar,supranote 21.
Reis, supranote 21.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841).
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any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may
be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at
least may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost
evanescent."12
The number of scholars that believe the CTEA legislation should
have been ruled unconstitutional is growing larger, albeit already
significant: "... a substantial consensus exists within the community of

is
CTEA
that
scholars
property
intellectual
American
unconstitutional."ll 3 The perspective of this exercise, however, looks
not only to the deviation from the norm in the judicial role of checks and
balances, but to the meaning and implications of balance that were
considered in the outcome.
IV. STRAWS INTHE WIND: A LIMITED AND LIMITING PERSPECTIVE

What might the purpose or outcome of this article be? That
depends on whether there is something to be gained from the perspective
of the flow of cases over the years before the Supreme Court. Not
everything is lineal or of consequence limited to any of the decisions
themselves. There are both intended and unintended consequences of
every decision. The use of prior case decision is often the reasoning
mode of choice. It is reasonably secure, safe and often with known
consequences. This use of precedent, however, often clouds issues,
allows miniscule changes in purpose or consequences. Sometimes it is
syllogistic, or supports interests that come before the Court to seek
protection at the expense of interests that may be in greater need but not
be represented."14
The composition of the Court reflects balance and the wisdom of
the years. An interesting example lies in the decision of the Court in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service." 5 The decision
raised some "eyebrows" and was noted critically for its repetitive
references to the Constitution and ensuing constitutional analysis
despite, what some believed, "adequate" statutory authority to resolve
the matter at hand. There is more than a scintilla of irony to this
112. Id. at 344.
113. Samuelson, supra note 28.
114. See generally Reis, The PublicBeneficialInterestin the IntellectualCommons, supranote
31. See also Reis, supra note 21, to appreciate the process of settlement on individual rights.
Consider as well the underlying issues in N.Y Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001), and Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (2009) (regarding settlement agreements and
representation).
115. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 359 (1991).
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perception taken in context. The decision was authored by Justice
O'Connor, a Justice "of balance" who often bridged the ideologies of the
individual Justices, in this case, to speak for a unanimous Court.11 6 This
criticism, however, doesn't address the question of why the Court felt
this necessary. Could it be that the Court believed it necessary to
assume the role of informing, reminding of bright lines and limitation, of
constitutional purpose and of achieving some measure of balance in
subject matter, private rights and public user? Or, could it be that lest
this citation and discourse some believed, we would otherwise be
without standard(s) to understand constitutional purpose, but simply
become the metaphysics of Justice Story? "
This never-ending search for standards has historically been the role
of the dissenter on the Court, such as Justice Douglas. As one goes
through the cases of these past two centuries, there have always been one
or more Justices that have performed this role, not to encapsulate the
moment, but to bring reason to the judicial role of constitutional balance in
interpretation and application." 8 Those that have performed this role in the
dissent were pronounced "gladiators" by Justice Cardozo who noted "those
who disagree with the majority, writing... the dissenter is 'the gladiator
making a last stand against the lions.""' 9 Some legal analysts believe that
dissents are an important part of the system of checks and balances. Justice
Charles E. Hughes, Chief Justice from 1930 to 1941, wrote, "A dissent ...
is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the
dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed." 20 And, they
have performed this role in concurrence.t 2 1
How many different ways can one, or the collective, come to the
same observations before they find their way into the halls of Congress
or the chambers of the court? While positioned to supposedly represent
the public interest, both Congress and the courts deal with advocates and

116. Id.
117. See supra note 29.
118. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
119. FREE ONLINE LAW DICTIONARY, Legal Definition of Dissent, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/dissent (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
120. LAWBRAIN.COM, Dissent, http://lawbrain.com/wikilDissent (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
121. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395-96 (2006) (Stevens, J., Kennedy,
J., Souter, J., and Souter, J., concurring). See also Reis, Rights and Remedies Post Ebay v.
MercExchange-Deep Waters Stirred, supra note 26, for an interesting exercise of separation of
powers. The Stirring consisted of attacking the use of precedent and practice in injunctions for over
150 years by noting that things right at one point in time may not be in later times and changed
circumstance.
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the resolution of conflicts. These resolutions themselves bring about
changes in balance. There cannot be an absolute constitutional or
congressional purpose. Time and balance most certainly changes almost
everything. But there cannot be a time when things are so far out of
balance that the future itself is threatened. The question is how to
measure, observe, determine and ensure sustainable futures. If this view
of the Court in the near term and the long term sheds light on anything, it
is that the Court's sense of balance remains intact. While Justice
Douglas reminds us in Mazer "[a]t times the Court has on its own
initiative considered and decided constitutional issues not raised, argued,
or briefed by the parties,"l 22 the fact is that there has not been one patent
or copyright case ruled unconstitutional. Eldred does not stand alone.
The issue to be taken with Eldred is the impact on the future by
minimization of the historic perceptions of the pillars of the
Constitution-"limited times" and "progress.123 There are always the
constant reminders in dissent of checks, as well as balance in the
exercise of discretion by the court that serves to ensure reasoned
protections for public rights, constitutional purpose and the intellectual
property rights created. There is an ever growing tension, however,
between private rights and public purpose. They are not necessarily
coincident; they are rivals for intellectual and economic value.
The "spate" of cases that occasioned this exercise evidenced the
role of the Court in seeking balance by protecting the future in limiting
private rights. In KSRI 24 and Bilski,12 5 the Court limited patent
monopolies to the narrow range of invention proper by application of
long held practice in claims construction and general principals "invent",
"discover", "new", "novel" and not "obvious." In Medlmmune,,26 the
Court found that the licensee does not give up the right to challenge the
validity of the patent, a holding respecting the integrity of the patent
process and the public interest. In Quanta Computer, Inc.,127 the firstsale doctrine was in issue and the Court found the doctrine of patent
exhaustion limited patent rights that survived the initial sale of the
patented subject. In Tsaini,12 8 the Court protected the copyright of the
author and determined that the provisions of §201(c) of the Copyright

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220 (1954).
See Eldred,537 U.S. 186.
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 U.S. 3218 (2010).
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001).
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Act prohibit publishers from reproducing the author's works in hard
copy or electronically without authorization.129 The fact that it was
properly published in a collection does not carry forward to the
individual reproduction. The holding of the Court will likely lead to
altered contractual arrangements between free-lance writers and
publishers, such as the New York Times.'"0 This was followed by the
suit in Muchnick,13 ' providing that copyright registration was not
jurisdictional and a bar to the filing of a copyright infringement action.
Likewise, in the administration of justice, balance has been recast to
fundamental principles of discretionary remedies of the court. In eBay,'32
the use of injunctive relief when there is "detriment to the public" and in
preventing "extortion" in the market place through the legal process by
use of remedies.'"
The wisdom of balance and understanding the limitations and
miscues of intellectual property interests can also be gleaned in cases not
listed in the spate precipitating this review. These cases of concern are
based on earlier holdings of the Court, and lower court actions that
followed.13 4 If one follows the sequence and flow of Feist 3' and
Mazer'36 into the context of two more recent lower court cases, one may
detect an imbalance in the misuse' 3 7 of the copyright interest to prevent
competition relative to "accidental" art in Pivot Point'38 and art of
questionable origin in Boisson.'39 While the court found infringement in
Boisson, it restored balance by exercising discretion in allowing only
proven damages to a single copyright interest of the copyright holder

129. 35 U.S.C. §201(c).
130. N.Y Times, 533 U.S. at 488.
131. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 U.S. 1237 (2009).
132. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (including majority and second
concurring opinion).
133. See generally Reis, Rights and Remedies Post Ebay v. MercExchange-Deep Waters
Stirred, supra note 26.
134. Some of the notable ones include Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), Pivot Point Int'l,
Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004), Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262
(2nd Cir. 2001) (copyright infringement), and Boisson v. Banian, Ltd, 280 F. Supp. 2d 10
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (damages). The latter two cases likely validate Justice Douglas' instinct that
competition, not expression, would rule the rulings of the Court, which one might have thought was
forestalled by constitutional reference in Feist.
135. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
136. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
137. Seegenerally WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2010).
138. Pivot Point, 372 F.3d 913.
139. See generally Boisson v. Banian Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2nd Cir. 2001) (finding copyright
infringement).
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and no attorney fees for either side. 14 0 Both of the Boisson decisions are
extensive and revealing of judicial balance. These three decisions taken
together may to some validate Justice Douglas' instinct that competition,
not expression, would rule the rulings of the court. 14 1
V. IT IS "WIZARDRY" OF BALANCE

Even where there is a questionable congressional or judicial
exercise (or non-exercise) 14 2 of power that causes ripples to the
foundations of constitutional interests, there is the ever present
possibility of political action or the discretion of the courts seeking
balance and rebalance. There is always the thought of relief in Congress
for interests in the public commons interests, as there was with
environmental issues in the middle of the 2 0 'h Century. A review of
proposed and enacted legislation might indicate that hasn't happened
yet.143 There is a distinct difference in perception when reading the
entire flow of cases of the past two centuries which may not be
appreciated by reading of isolated cases or the published works of some
scholars. The difference is one of appreciating the "wizardry" of
balance that comes into focus when reading the string of cases from the
inception to the present. This exercise spotlights the genius of checks
and balances.'"
140. See generally Boisson v. Banian Ltd., 280 F. Supp. 2d 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (ameliorating
by damages).
141. Thereby justifying and making one wonder about that which might have thought
forestalled by his extended constitutional references in Feist.
142. Approaching the decade after Eldred, there is a tranquility or peace that prevails no check,
but the decisions reflect adaptation to the now "infamous" prefatory language and vast expansion in
duration of copyright interests by "balance" which maintains most cases close to the two centuries
of interpretation and administration ofconstitutional interests.
143. Most legislation appears to be directed at increasing private rights, increasing protection
ofprivate rights, increasing penalties and the appointment of intellectual property tsars.
144. The first of two significant tests of copyright is likely to come in Viacom Int'lInc.v. YouTube,
Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). This is reflected in the current appeal from the decision of
the lower court, specifically focusing on questions conceming the intent and impact of safe harbor
provided ISPs under the DMCA. Another imminent challenge regards the role and capacity ofthe court
to resolve conflicts involving the use ofnew technologies in the intellectual property arena. These issues
lie at the heart of the rejection of the Google Book Settlement Agreement by the district court. The
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 2011 WL 986049 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011).
The court indicates that the resolution of these issues is a matter for congressional action because of the
prospective nature of maters included within the settlement agreement. While the court might well have
been able to craft a remedy limited to the parties before it, deferring to Congress to resolve this case may
raise issues of the retroactive exercise of the legislative finction. The fundamentals and reach of any
decision in the case presents a mountain of a quandary. The case requires a resolution of the issues
before the court, yet guidance and thus deference to Congress in addressing issues of technologies,
private rights and constitutional purpose for the future-assuredly matters of delicate balance.

